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Abstract
The United States equity market is made up of both private and public trading
venues, creating a framework dark and light trading liquidity. Private or non-publicly
visible liquidity is housed in dark venues while liquidity visible to the public sits in light
locations. Light markets follow strict real-time public reporting requirements for trade
volume and price; their dark counterparts execute transactions without a real-time
reporting requirement. The informational asymmetries that result from this difference in
reporting create a “two-tiered” market. The dark sector’s participants know both the
public and dark, private, trade volumes and price, while the public participating in the
light market knows only the publicly reported light sector volume and price information.
Dark sector participants, institutional investors, then participate in the market using both
private and public information, whereas the public investor only has access to the public
information. This project seeks to motivate a real-time reporting requirement for trade
volume and price in the dark sector of the market in order to remedy this public versus
private asymmetry.
The informational parameters in this thesis are only those relating to the trades
taking place and their respective volumes and prices, not other outside of the market or
participant specific informational parameters commonly used in the study of
informational asymmetries. This project is an attempt to bridge both the legal aspects and
ii

economic foundations relating to the issues surrounding dark sector reporting. Sections I
through IV seek to detail the sector and its regulation while sections V through VII
briefly describe the related economic literature and the simple model at the heart of this
thesis. Additional relevant citations on many issues outside the narrow breadth of this
project can be found in the appendices and bibliography.
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Section I.
Introductions and Dark Beginnings1
Financial markets are vast, every growing, and ever changing. Each day
transactions, assessments, expectations, and the process by which markets introduce
buyer and seller evolve. The venues where transactions take place are as varied and
multifaceted as the financial mechanisms being traded. The United States is a global
leader in the equity market internationally and has always stayed several years ahead of
its European counterparts and even decades ahead of the Asian markets. With this comes
a well-developed and detailed framework of regulations and an even more intricate and
developed system of financial institutions and mechanisms. Part of the US dominance in
the equity field stem from the surrounding landscape of technologically companies and
private equity/venture capital firms surrounding the development of the domestic equity
markets. Innovation and development in the land of equity markets are in a constant state
of redevelopment, recalibration, and refinement. The battle for market share has been
termed a “technological arms race” by many in the industry2, as technology seems to lead
the market in offerings, assets and mechanisms, and hosting services. The dark sector’s
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“The Dark Side of the Force is the pathway to many abilities some consider to be…
Unnatural.” - Senator Palpatine, Star Wars: Episode III, Revenge of the Sith (2005).
2

Karl Marx also uses this description in reference to industrial capitalism; many
academics outside of the financial sector discourse on the importance of technological
competition.
1

existence is a cumulative result of the market regulatory changes and development taking
place from the late 1990’s through early 2000’s. Technological innovations, regulatory
changes, the decimalization of the equity sector, and the growth of capital accumulation
and mobility through institutional investors provided a driver for dark venues and their
services. Communication, processing speeds, and storage capabilities fundamentally
changed the execution of trades and exponentially increased the speed of the market and
its related information. Regulatory developments of the late 1990’s provided registration
requirements for Alternative Trading Systems, required best quote dynamics to induce
competition amongst differing trading orders, and regulation FD mandated information
disclosure vastly shrinking the opportunity for information arbitrage. Decimalization
reduced spreads down from unit “ticks” into decimal values, lowering profit margins and
reducing liquidity values at a given price level. Institutional investors with large stores of
accumulated capital, sophisticated market awareness, and complex sell and buy side
liquidity preferences permanently altered the dynamics associated with trading volume
and trade size. Dark liquidity has existed since the inception of the financial sector.
Information-dark liquidity in the form of off-exchange trading and within book exchange
mechanisms was always a facet of the market. Recent temporal, technological, and
regulatory catalysts pushed the dark sector into the large market share it holds today. The
old “high-touch” financial market model where the major exchanges held a monopoly
over the entire equity sector is fading as the “low-touch” dark equity model takes over an
ever-growing market share with an ever growing array of different venues and trading
mechanisms catering to the differing needs of the institutional trading giants.
2

The dark sector is not necessarily a negative facet to the market as a whole as
many have hypothesized. The focus need not be on the existence of the dark sector itself,
but instead on the ability of the entire market to find an accurate market price. There are
important informational characteristics for determining that accurate price inside the
liquidity pools in the dark sector. The volume and price for each transaction in the dark
sector are central informational components necessary for the market at large to
determine an accurate price. This volume and price information must reach the light
market’s participants real time in order for the market as a whole to determine an
accurate price and for all participants to have the opportunity to trade at that price.
Different informational reporting requirements for the light and dark sectors creates
separate informational tiers in the market; the public sector is at a disadvantage compared
to those who are participating in the dark sector. This dynamic creates concerns for both
welfare and fairness for those who lack the capabilities to transact in the dark sector and
are therefore trapped in the public market. The informational disadvantage to the public
sector prevents its public only participants from meaningfully participating in the
financial market because they lack the informational access necessary to transact at the
most accurate price. Light sector participants lack the transaction related volume and
price information necessary to be aware of the most accurate market price, while the dark
sector’s participants have access to that information. While a real time reporting
requirement for volume and price would not cure the current issues associated with high
frequency trading and others associated with our current regulatory reporting system, its

3

implementation would rectify the informational inequality among market participants
who transact in the light sector with those who transact in both the light and the dark.

4

Section II.
Migration to the Dark Side3
Dark liquidity has always existed. In fact it is safe to say that before strict
reporting requirements and the development of major exchanges and regulatory oversight
bodies to whom reporting was done, all trades were in some sense, dark. The light sector
is thought of as the traditional trading scheme because it has been the most publicly
visible and prominent trading arena since before the 1930’s. The dark side on the other
hand has always been shielded from public view and public awareness where possible.
From its inception, off book, off exchange, or under the table trading practices have
always been dark in the sense that the transaction’s participants expressly used the dark
liquidity or mechanism to avoid going through public venues. The most important issues
for the purpose of this discussion are the benefits and purposes of using the dark sector
and how information present in the dark sector is regulated compared to those same
characteristics in the light, or reporting, sector.
It is relevant here to comment that the dark and light sectors make up the market
as a whole, and that dark and light liquidity can execute one another. In this regard it is an
over simplification to discuss the light and dark sectors as if they are two separate
markets. The light and the dark sectors make up the trading market as we know it, and

3

"Ahh, hard to see, the Dark Side is." – Yoda, Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom
Menace (1999).
5

their relative market share and its implication is, at least in part, the focus of this paper.
What follows is a brief overview of what has motivated participants in the past and
currently to use the dark sector, and how the sector’s transformation has led to the
perception of dark liquidity we have today.
The development of dark trading mechanisms and the dark liquidity sector would
fail to exist if it were the case that there was no difference between trading in the light
sector and the dark. The dark sector theoretically provides market participants with four
central benefits their light counterpart does not; confidentiality in the trades executed,
reduced or avoided market impact relating to the trades, cost savings through dark venues
or methods, and the opportunity for price improvement or profit. These four central
tenants make up the rationale behind the existence of the dark sector and motivate the
bounds sought by the regulation that have grown to surround the sector itself. Early on
these opportunities for informational, price, and anonymity control led some market
participants to work trades “off the books” and for other participants to use the early
broker dealer regulations (or lack thereof) to execute trades without being forced to enter
informational reports about the transactions. While today’s dark sector is a much more
varied and complicated field, the benefits to making trades in the dark have changed little
since the inception of the market itself.
The central benefit that has remained perhaps the strongest motivation for
partaking in the dark sector’s transactional offerings is the ability to reduce market
impact (or preserve price improvement or price control abilities). A reduction in market
impact rests on several dark-ness related assumptions. The first of which is that the trade
6

itself actually carries the potential to impact the market; small trades leave little market
impact whereas large or block trades can have a serious impact on the trading price of an
asset where trading activity is visible. On an exchange where information is constantly
displayed regarding trading behavior the supply of and demand for a certain asset
determines its price. If a large block of shares placed into the exchange for purchase the
supply would greatly increase and without an equivalent increase in the demand for that
asset the price would decline. This price drop is the negative market impact institutional
or large block investors are trying to avoid by executing their block trades through dark
frameworks. Institutional investor interests in keeping large or block trading as “quiet” as
possible also rest on preventing the negative implications that result when others are able
to “see” the trade crossing the market. (SEC Proposed Rule on Dark Pools, 2013)
Other benefits relating to the anonymity of the transaction and the opportunity for
relatively low costs4 in transacting away from the major or light venues are the point of
much current discussion. Developments in reporting requirements made even dark sector
transactions information laden. Where transactions would be reported at delayed times
relative to the public sector and while those reports may protect some information
regarding who transacted the trade itself, the communicative and informational
capabilities of the current millennia had made anonymity a benefit of the past. A similar
issue has arisen with the cost of transacting trades it the dark sector. While the cost to
each individual transaction may be equal to or relatively less than those transactions in

4

Costs both in relationship to the transacting with the dark venue and reduced costs for
transacting large or controlled trades that may be costly when transacting with an
exchange.
7

the light sector; the cost of remaining informed about dark transactions may be
preventatively high. The informational analysis and synthesis capabilities required to
remain informed with regard to other transactions taking place in the dark sector may
require the participation in multiple different dark pools and the ability to synthesis trade
information flowing from each individual dark venue or aggregator. Without these
capabilities, the market participant is in essence just as blind as the public with regard to
other dark sector transactions. Transactional costs in this sense include not only the costs
associated with completing the transaction, but also the risk that other dark players know
information that you do not. While trade anonymity and low transactional costs were
previously central benefits to trading in the dark sector, they are no longer clear points
differentiating life in the light and life in the dark. Instead, price controls and market
impact controls emerged as the dominant features driving dark participants to transact.
This focus on price and market impact has also led to a change in the type of
mechanism dark transactions go through. In the past off book, off exchange, and other
behind closed door transactions could take place in a multitude of different ways; upstairs
markets, broker dealer trades, and on actual dark liquidity venues. This dark sector has
evolved from a series of varied mechanisms into a landscape of primarily “crossing”
oriented venues. The focus on impact control and price benefit has led to a dark sector
landscape dotted with transaction focused venues and venue aggregators. These venues
provide participants with access to a variety of different informational control options and
access to other dark participants and venues. These informational controls are now almost
entirely related to the size of the trade being reported, the division amongst shares in a
8

particular trade, and the temporal and price related controls regarding the actual
execution of the trade itself. While the dark landscape holds a plethora of venues, the
venues all offer similar trade types, services, and conform to one of several venue
designs. The dark sector is no longer as a varied as it once was, at least in part due to the
narrowing of benefits flowing from dark transactions. The growth in market share of the
dark sector is also likely a result of the changing dynamics of market participation. Many
see the increase in size and number of institutional investors while the individual market
participant has become more and more rare. A growth in the presence of institutional
traders means a growth in the number of market participants capable of transacting in the
dark sector, while there are no empirical studies to support this market change, the
increasing presence and power of institutional investors in the market suggests an
increase in the use of alternative trading mechanisms.

9

Section III.
Dark Structure, Dark Actors, Dark Forces5
The dark sector is made up of many venues and many aggregators. Colloquially
these are often called “pools” and these pools refer to the groups of liquidity within the
sector itself being housed in different venues or aggregators of venues. The dark pool
does not represent a single venue or even a single type of equity trading mechanism. A
Dark Pool can be defined broadly as any mechanism or venue that houses dark liquidity.6
Dark liquidity is anonymous or non-displayed liquidity, or trade ready shares of a certain
asset which have some level of information concealment/control related to their trades.
Liquidity is anonymous or non-displayed if it is submitted or transacted through a venue
confidentially and without full visibility to the market at large. The dark sector is then the
culmination of all the dark venues and trading mechanisms through which liquidity can
be transacted in the dark (without reporting). The assets traded in the dark sector are the
same stocks and assets that are traded on the light market (generally, NSM stocks).
While the light market includes both the primary or initial offering (IPO) market
and the secondary market for the NMS stocks it carries, the dark market is only
comprised of secondary trading liquidity; trades where shares are offered for the first
5

“Size matters not. Look at me. Judge me by my size, do you?” - Yoda, Star Wars
Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back (1980).
6

Definitions for key terms can be found in Appendix II.
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time to the public do not take pace in the dark sector. Initial offers and primary market
sales cannot take place through dark venues. Unlike the light market, the dark sector, for
various reasons, tended in the past toward large block trading with a heavy reliance on
informational and trade parameters. Block trading transacts shares in large share blocks,
groups or pools of 1,000 shares or more. These are the types of trades that would have the
most intense market impact if they were transacted in the light and were typically
transacted in the dark to avoid those implications. However, the types of transactions
currently taking place in the dark sector are smaller groupings of shares, 300 shares per
transaction on average. What used to be large single block transactions are now split into
smaller groupings of shares to be transacted through several venues simultaneously. This
both helps to avoid shallow liquidity issues venue to venue and controls the leakage of
trade information coming out of any single venue relating to the size of the full
transaction. The dark sector depends greatly on transactional liquidity controls and strong
informational control of leakage with which to manipulate and hide these massive multipiece transactions.
These two control facets come in many different types of pre-packaged trade
offers and many different varieties of trade venues. These venues carry a vast array of
services and functions and each venue is its own unique entity seeking to provide deep
liquidity with a strong control on certain informational parameters related to the exchange
(minimizing information leakage). The quintessential dark venue is the Crossing Network
(CN). The crossing network is the most simple and most common venues found in the
dark; other varieties of dark venues are typically structured based on the CN model. The
11

CN allows participants to enter priced orders and transact the order when matching
interest is available. The single price for the transaction is derived from the light market
price. (Securities and Exchange Commission, “Regulation of Exchanges,” 1997).
Crossing networks, working entirely in the dark, allow participants to control a great deal
of the information relating to their executions and their simplicity helps to avoid
information leakage and over-complication of transactions.
All dark mechanisms do not share the same level of informational controls with
marked differences between CNs relating to how much informational freedom or control
is available during a trade. In this context, not all dark pools are equally dark. Some pools
allow for different forms of information to leave the pool, “leak out,” or simply be
available to other participants in the pool, for this reason some venues are termed Gray
Pools instead of carrying the normal dark nomenclature. The central commonality to all
dark equity mechanisms is some form or degree of information control with regard to the
trade itself.
Fundamentally, trades are executed in the dark in a similar fashion to those in the
light. Order parameters and execution requests function in almost the exact same fashion
for the most part. In some instances IOI’s (Indication of Interest) or mechanism specific
communication capabilities allow dark participants to employ more evasive or more
communicative strategies for moving their assets than those capabilities afforded by the
light market. However, the most important difference is the dark sector allows for explicit
display or information parameters to be controlled with regard to the order. When trading
across a dark venue (depending on the venue’s acceptable parameters), the investor can
12

control the amount of information that gets displayed relating to his order. The order’s
informational components can be manipulated so that its volume is completely hidden,
partially hidden, or fractured into multiple pieces described above. It is useful to note that
the assets transacting through a dark venue, a gray venue, and those transacting in the
light are not separate. Though informational parameters differ greatly amongst the trades
that have taken place, dark, gray, and light orders can execute together or on one another.
This means that some of the informational requests of parameters can include making
part of the order dark and part of the order light, or any combination in between.
The dark sector is predicated on the ability to execute transactions in order to
control the display or leakage of information relating to the trade itself. Part of this
control requires that a venue be able to transact the entire or the planned portion of the
transaction without having to seek additional liquidity from another venue. The more a
trade has to be broken up for execution on different venues or gets “shopped” around
from venue to venue in an attempt to find liquidity to transact the execution the more
information leaks out into the market and the less dark the transaction becomes. As time
and number of venues increase, the risk of information leakage among the venues grows,
and the trade becomes less and less dark. The necessity for access to deep liquidity in
each of the venues themselves is part and parcel to the venue being able to completely
control the information it releases to only those participating in it and not the participants
at other venues. If the venue or aggregator has to go outside its network or to other
independent venues to find additional liquidity information leaks out as a result of venue
contacting additional venues about the transaction.
13

Dark mechanisms report trading parameters and opportunities to trade to their
participants. They do not report the information regarding their transactions and the
information present in the pool itself (interests to transact, pings, and other venue related
communications) to the public at large, only the pools participants are privy to those
informational pieces.7 Only participants in the pools gain information about the trades
taking place, the volume of liquidity available in the pool, the information on future
trades, and other opportunities within the pool or venue itself. Though transactions that
take place in the dark may be invisible to the light market for a period of time, it is not
the case that the venues themselves do not carry information. The venue must connect
buyer and seller for any transaction to proceed, and for that to take place, pool
participants must constantly be informed about trade opportunities, possibilities, the
liquidity available, etc. The difference in who gets the information in the light (the
general public) and who gets it in the dark (only pool participants), has led to the dark
sector being classified as a private market while the light is the public market.8 In the
public light part of the market, all trading information is disseminated to the public at
large through real time trading information posted on open and accessible mechanisms
(SEC Open Meeting Fact Sheet, Oct. 2009), while in the dark, the venues report small
informational tags or informational subsets real time to their participants. This

7

Dark venues report trade volumes to CTA in delayed or non-real time reporting. CTA
then distributes that information in the same method as real time (light) exchange
reporting. This reporting does not include the information relating to pings, IOI’s, or
other venue specific pre-trade information.
8

This dynamic may also represent a strategic attempt to allow market distortion and price
setting within the pool framework; these issues are outside the breadth of this thesis.
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informational reporting dynamic has led many to call the current market a two-tiered
system; where those predicating in the dark sector have both the information
disseminated through the dark pools in which they participate and the information
available to the public at large, while the general public only has the information that
results from real time reporting in the light venues (SEC Release 2011).
The result of this dynamic is the dark sector’s participants have more information
than is afforded to the public through real time reporting, making the dark participants the
top tier with more information and the public becomes the lower tier with only the
information reported by CTA. This inequality in informational access is only exacerbated
by the method in which dark participants can participate in the market as a whole. The
market’s dark sector participants are institutional investors; large, heavy in assets and
capital; typically investment firms, major banks, and other major market movers.9 These
major players are sophisticated in their market experience, expertise, and their
technological capabilities. They operate in the light and dark sectors concurrently using
strategies and methods of mechanized and by hand trading regimes.
“In practice the largest payers are likely to employ multiple strategies.
They may tap the light and dark markets, simultaneously advertise and
hide, use multiple dark venues, publish indications of interest rather than
firm orders, use deceptive strategies to shake off any form of front
runners, and use multiple brokers in some situations and take direct
control of their orders in other cases.” (Banks 2010)
Institutional investors carry massive stores of mobile capital and have developed
resources for measuring the market and its dynamics; institutional investors are the
9

Institutional investors are the Dark Actors in this model. They are (pardon the analogy)
the sith lords of the modern financial market; sophisticated and holding sufficient capital
to control the dark-light relationship completely.
15

quintessential purveyors of dark and high-volume trading. Dark venues and the nodisplayed sector play host to high level gaming, algorithmic trading, and other dark
roaming tools that make dark market participation increasingly dangerous for the average
or non-institutional investor. Beneficial executions through the light and dark markets
require an extremely developed tactical approach common almost exclusively to
institutional firms that house dedicated and intricate algorithmic trading capabilities,
stores of deep liquidity, and the ability to seek expertise from brokers and block-dealers.
The institutional investor’s goal in participating in the market is to facilitate reaching a
better price by strategically participating in the dark and light sectors of the market.
Institutional investors are big, they are backed by hundreds of millions of dollars
in capital and assets, and they carry the most well developed and experienced market
strategies that exist. However, one of their most important features is how they tend to
participate in the dark sector. Because dark reporting is only made to pool participants,
only the participants in each individual pool know about the availability of transactions or
liquidity. In order to be party to all available transactions and all available dark
information, institutional investors have availed themselves of participating in many, if
not all, the venues and aggregators in the dark sector. Consequently, the institution
knows the information present in every venue, and therefore, all the information present
in the dark sector at any time. Being privy to every pool is costly and only the biggest
institutions can foot the bill and the costs associated with dealing with the bulk of
information they receive. This participation dynamic produces an extreme to the twotiered informational groups where the big institutions have access to all the information
16

present in the market at any time, all the dark information and any public information
available, while the public only has access to the information stemming from the light
sector.
This presents major fairness and welfare concerns for the public’s ability to
meaningfully participate in the market. Excluding long-term investment, making money
on the market relies entirely on knowledge of the accurate or appropriate price for a stock
at any given time. Without access to the full gambit of available information relating to
the appropriate price being offered and asked for a given stock in any sector of the market
the public cannot properly price its own transactions, and more importantly the light
sector may carry an inaccurate price. These informational parameters will be discussed
later in relation to market efficiency models; however, the focus here is not on market
efficiency, but instead on the welfare concerns that result from an unequal distribution of
informational access among market participants. The institutional investors are privy to
information about the volume and price for the transactions taking place in the dark
sector real time and the public is not; dark participants are aware of all facets relating to
an appropriate price and the public is not.
In the light sector exchange trades are reported or displayed as they take place,
real time. So the public is made aware of the changing supply and demand dynamics of
each asset as it gets traded in and out of the exchange. The public has information about
the depth of liquidity, breadth of the market, and the markets determined price for any
asset being traded. In the dark context it is quite possible that none of this information
exists. In the dark market sector, there may only be certain informational parameters
17

available with regard to a trade, the volume in a pool, or the volume in the sector as a
whole.
Trading volume flowing across dark pools is measured in a myriad of ways and
few venues use the same metrics for examining their own trading volume. The four more
common measurement parameters for the equity sector are; the immediacy at which
trading can take place, the breadth of a given market, the depth of that market, and the
resiliency of the security (asset) itself. Immediacy, breadth, and depth all reflect the
liquidity a given venue has in a certain asset; how fast the trade can be executed, how
much can be executed at once; and spread at which a price can be determined. Resiliency
of the asset reflects the nature of the price stability associated with the asset and how
easily it might fluctuate. One central issue with regard to the information pertaining to
each one of these parameters is that by the very nature of being dark, the venues housing
dark liquidity are the only entities that have access to this information about their markets
and it is to their benefit to be the most liquid and appealing they can possibly make
themselves.
“Measuring liquidity in a marketplace is a complicated proposition, made
even more complex by growing pockets of activity in non-displayed
forums, where record keeping and data reporting are not always
mandatory or uniform, and where certain venues may have some interest
in presenting statistics in one direction or another.” (Banks 2010)
The current reporting systems, fail to distinguish between light and dark trading
activity and they do not require a standardized method for volume calculation. For
example, there are several different metrics for “counting” the number or volume or
orders that come across an exchange interface; metrics relate to the number of orders
18

processed, those actually executed, and several different measures exist for how to count
those orders (some venues double count, some single count, some only count executions,
and others include all orders that ‘touch’ their venue). In this case it is possible for the
same number of orders to be counted at least four different ways, leading venues to
constantly calculate their trading volumes differently.
The basic result is not only does the general public have little idea as to what goes
on in the dark, even where the dark sector reports its volume and general trading
information to the regulatory bodies, the metrics for volume, trades, and market share
present a varied and unreliable measure. In short the only parties who know how much
trading activity and how much volume is being transacted through the dark sector are the
institutional investors participating in the pools and the venues themselves, and even
those entities have to manage the differences from venue to venue in volume and trade
classification and definition. The dark sector’s measurement is almost impossible to
take10 without specific guidelines for volume, trade, execution, and liquidity definitions
and regulations.
Central to the issue of measuring the dark sector, its pools, and venues is the
structure of the dark sector itself. In its early years, the dark sector blossomed into a
framework of venues each holding small pools of liquidity, and the entire sector carrying
a small share of the market as a whole. As the popularity of transacting in the dark
progressed, the sector fragmented into many small venues offering smaller and smaller

10

The current estimations as to the market share actually held in the dark sector range
from 25 – 45% of the NMS market in the United States, and little work has lately been
completed regarding the accuracy of either end of these estimations.
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pools of liquidity. Fragmentation has both benefits and consequences. While a
fragmented nature provides the opportunity for competition, it also has the potential to
render trading sub-optimal. Whether or not fragmentation actually leads, through a loss in
liquidity, to sub-optimality inside a given venue (as opposed to across an entire market)
has been the topic of hot debate and many believe that any loss of optimality has more to
do with the structure of the trading mechanism than the fragmentation or loss of liquidity
itself. However, there are those who see greater fragmentation across multiple venues as
a “potential for system failures to spread quickly and affect the entire market,” (Stiglitz;
WSLawyer.com, Sec. 19) More from the lack of liquidity than the threat of possible
systematic failures, the dark sector has for several years been in the process of
consolidating itself. Competition and a general need for access to liquidity to execute
block trades gave way to mass consolidation of venues under venue aggregators. While
any venue could control some of the parameters with regard to its trade, where there was
a lack of liquidity, shopping around venue to venue for liquidity reduced the
informational controls associated with the trade itself. The mode from which trades can
be given parameters and traded in bulk, pieces, as ice-bergs11 or anything else depends on
the trade actually taking place in real time across the exchange mechanism; with many
small dark venues coming online competition increased and dark sector fragmentation
became a growing issue. Liquidity and the fungibility of liquidity and execution are
central to the success of any trading mechanism, without access to sufficient commodity
volume a trading pool “dries up.” While offering specialized and commoditized trading
11

Tip or small subset of the trade is made visible to the light market, while the bulk of the
trade is kept dark or hidden (all Titanic references aside).
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parameters and structures is the norm in the dark sector, the diversity of venues has
spread liquidity thinly and has motivated consolidation among venues and mechanisms in
hopes of gaining an increase in depth and liquidity. With an increase in liquidity, trading
volumes increased leading to a drop in execution related costs and suggesting that the
dark sector experiences highly effective internal economies of scale. The relationship of
this consolidation dynamic to the volume or execution volume related regulatory
practices will be discussed in a later section, but it is safe to say that the sector itself no
longer carries individual or unconnected venues. The vast majority of venues are housed
under aggregators or connected through contractual agreements to other venues where
informational controls can flow through the aggregator’s venues and the connected
venues with minimal informational leakage. The consolidation and aggregator
developments have side-stepped many of the earlier issues with shallow pool liquidity
and inability to complete full transactions present in the more antiquated version of the
dark sector.
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Section IV.
Dark Regulation12
The regulation of the securities markets has, from its inception, been based on the
notion that providing information to market participants provides fairness (Hatch 2010)
and efficient market function (Malkiel 1992). The basic regulatory framework is a system
of informational disclosure requirements whereby the nation’s publicly held companies
submit information through public reporting requirements so the public is constantly
informed of the relevant information necessary to determine a proper price and to
facilitate informed and fair trading. The earliest securities or national market regulatory
acts were the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.13 These
Acts serve as the foundation to the nation’s current regulatory framework and delegate
regulatory authority to the Securities and Exchanges Commission. Explicit further
refinements of the regulatory landscape did not take place until the 1990’s, when
restrictions and reporting requirements on brokers, broker-dealers, public companies, and
exchanges dramatically increased the amount of information entering the market.14 The
best price available and the spread of each stock being traded was now made publicly
12

“This is some rescue! You came in here, but didn’t you have a plan for getting out?” Princess Leia, Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977).
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Citations, explanations, and additional information on regulation, regulatory entities,
and governmental bodies can be found in Appendix I.
14

Regulation OHR and Regulation FD
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available, and public companies had to increase their public reporting to include many
previously unattainable informational parameters; stock sales, managerial decisions, and
other pertinent information. The public was now granted a direct look into public trading
exchanges and the companies being traded.
In the late 90’s and early 2000’s regulations on alternative trading systems and the
national market system changed the previous interpretations and reporting requirements
for the alternative or non-major exchanges.15 While the systematic requirements for the
major exchanges and public companies changed little as a result of regulations ATS and
NMS, the alternative or non-major exchanges classified under Sections 5 and 6 of the
Exchange Act were formally defined and explicitly excluded from the reporting
requirements of the major exchanges. Alternative trading systems include the
mechanisms used to trade dark liquidity. Regulation ATS and NMS both excluded the
dark sector from following the informational reporting required on the major exchanges
and instead instituted a by volume reporting system, which allows for delayed trade
volume reports instead of real time trade by trade reporting. Regulation NMS created the
volume decimalization reporting system to be followed at all exchanges carrying
National Market Stocks. The mass decimalization of the market led to a dramatic increase
in the use of dark block trading practices because it drastically changed the market’s
spread dynamics and best price offering requirements substancially increased the impact
large trades had on the market price of a decimalized stock.

15

Regulation ATS and Regulation NMS
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Under this framework, the mechanisms of the dark sector register as brokerdealers, and fall within the Alternative Trading System definition under the Acts and
have their own particular reporting requirements. The only two hurdles that must be
cleared in order to trade as an alternative system and avoid being classified as a major
exchange, are first to register as a broker-dealer, explicitly placing oneself under the ATS
definition, and second that the trading volume one executes does not exceed 5% of the
national trading volume in that particular stock (NMS stocks).16 This orientation on
exchange determination in concert with the aggregator venue structure of the dark sector
will be discussed at length later. It is useful to note that under the ATS definition the
percentage of NMS stock transacted is only a requirement on venues, which actually
execute trades. This regulation does not apply to aggregators or brokers or dealers, who
do not actually execute trades themselves. The entities connecting traders to venues or to
other traders can handle far more than 5% of an NMS stock in referrals or connects,
while it is the venues they connect traders to that are held to the 5% ceiling. An
aggregator can handle 6% or more in a given stock as long as each of the venues it houses
or direct clients to transacts a volume less than 5%.
This framework of regulatory mechanisms worked to motivate an even greater
movement into the dark sector. The 1933 and 34 Acts required that the public market
always be informed; regulations through the 1990’s required a greater and greater
informational swath be provided to the public; regulation ATS explicitly removed dark
trading mechanisms from the reporting requirements of the major exchanges; and

16

Regulation ATS
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regulation NMS decimalized the market as a whole causing price impact to become
unavoidable. The public market became so informed and the spreads on decimalized
stocks had become so small with block trading causing massive market reaction each
time a block entered the well informed market, the dark sector became the outlet. The
dark sector allowed for informational controls, reduction in the impact block trading
might have on the market, and most centrally, the dark sector was not required to report
its trades in real time. It is then little surprise that the dark sector’s growth has been
nothing but astronomical in the past years and pressures to ‘fix’ the regulatory gap in
informational reporting spurred a plethora of regulatory attempts. (Gallo 2009)
In the fall of 2009 the Securities and Exchange Commission held an open meeting
in hopes of proposing a new set of regulation over the dark sector as fears about its
strength, market share, and volume began to come to fruition. The meeting was titled,
“Strengthening the Regulation of Dark Pools,” (SEC Open Meeting Oct. 2009) and
specified two central regulatory goals or focus points for the proposed regulation: to
require some form of publicly available material as to the investor’s interest in the sale or
purchase of an asset and to the identity of the venue processing the transaction itself. The
proposal was intended to enhance transparency and to promote fairer, more efficient
markets for stocks listed in the US. The Commission later proposed a three-part rulemaking (SEC Release No. 34-60997) in hopes of attaining these regulatory goals: [1] to
include the information contained within the dark venues in public reporting, [2] to alter
the volume requirement under regulation ATS17 in an attempt to force dark venues to

17

Changing the volume marker from 5% to .25%.
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register as public exchanges, and [3] to change the information disseminated as a result of
the delayed volume reporting coming out of dark venues. This regulation was never
enacted, but was followed by a 2011 FINRA filing with the Commission in which the
Regulatory Authority sought to allow certain alternative venues to be excluded from
reporting requirements and other requirements (similar to the aims of regulation ATS),
though this attempt was also never made operable. (FINRA Proposed Rule Change,
2011)
As of yet, no new rules have been put into place to balance the flow of
information in the public exchanges with information in the dark sector. The implications
of what might have been for the 2009 SEC rule proposition will be discussed at length in
concert with the model proposed in this project. The orientation of previous regulation
has both created the demand for dark sector liquidity and helped to foster its growth. The
latest rule-making attempts have not been focused on the right issue of regulation, the
informational parameters being reported and the type of reporting taking place. The focus
and breadth of previous regulation instrumentally created the demand for the dark sector
while also being inadequately and improperly focused to bring about an information
balance between the light and the dark sectors.
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Section V.
Informational Asymmetries, Dark Impact, Dark Price18
The importance of information has been a pillar of market function and exchange
for centuries; exchanges and games of chance were thought to depart from equality or
fairness when different participants had different levels of information about the situation
or the exchange (Cardano 1564). The efficiency of markets based on the information
reflected in its exchanges dates back to the 17th century (Gibson 1889). The notion that
complete information makes markets efficient has been the bedrock for informational
reporting requirements and the notion of market participant equality almost since the
inception of the market itself. The notion of market efficiency was codified in Fama’s
1970 Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1970).
A market is efficient if the price being offered on the market for an asset fully
reflects all the relevant information available (Fama 1970). This can also be defined as
the market carrying a price that is unaffected by revealing information to market
participants, in other words, the price already reflects all relevant information (Malkiel
1992). The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) itself asserts that markets are in fact
efficient. This claim has been refuted by many, supported by some, and completely
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“If there's a bright center to the universe, you're on the planet that it's farthest from.” –
Luke Skywalker, Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977).
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disassembled by others; and there remains little consensus as to the effectiveness or
accuracy of the model itself. However, for the purpose of this examination, the important
features of the EMH model are its definitional components and the importance it places
on the types, freedom, and completeness of the informational parameters that should go
into determining the market price for an asset.
Definitionally, the components and interpretations associated with the EMH can
be viewed as moving goalposts as opposed to firm definitions; however, they are of no
less importance (Sewell 2011). An efficient securities market can be described as one
where, given all available information, actual prices on the market are reliable or good
estimates for the intrinsic values of each of the stocks or securities being transacted
(Fama 1965 (The Behavior of Stock-market Prices)). The market is one where
participants work to profit maximize and relevant information is freely (or almost freely)
available to all participants (Fama 1965 (Random Walks in Stock Market Prices); Coase
1960). The market must both fully and quickly reflect all the information which is
relevant and available for each of its securities (Fama 1969/1970). This type of market
efficiency and complete information reflection in prices can also be defined as efficiency
that makes it impossible to make money by trading on current information since that
information must already be fully reflected in the price of an asset (Jensen 1978). These
definitions, along with the plethora of other re-workings, expansions, and consolidations,
are all focused on the central notion of the market being constantly and fully informed in
order to be termed “efficient.” The most relevant culmination of this notion comes from
Malkiel,
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“A capital market is said to be efficient if it fully and correctly reflects all
relevant information in determining security price. Formally, the market is
said to be efficient with respect to some information set, Ø, if security
prices would be unaffected by revealing that information to all
participants. Moreover, efficiency with respect to an information set, Ø,
implies that it is impossible to make economics profits form trading on the
basis of Ø.” (1992)
Based on these definitions, the regulatory framework surrounding the information
attached to the trades taking place in dark sector, the public sector is not efficient with
regard to the information held in the dark sector. In Fama’s design the EMH model
contains three forms or strengths regarding the relevance or importance of different
information in the market being efficient or inefficient. The three forms include; [1] the
Weak Efficiency form, where the relevant information already included in the price
extends to only information about past prices, [2] the Semi-Strong Efficiency form,
where the relevant information set includes all information available to all the market
participants, and [3] the Strong Efficiency form, where all information, including private
information, is already taken into account in the market price of an asset (Fama
1970/1991). The first and second forms can be regarded as the typical view of the public
market or light sector; the previous price movements of a given stock are known to all
market participants, and any other publicly available information has already been traded
upon such that additional profits cannot be made by trading on the currently available
information. The third form, or Strong Form, suggests that even the information held
privately and not available to the public market has already been taken into account in the
public market price of an asset. Given the current structure, punishing insider trading, the
strong form seems an inappropriate application to the real world securities market. The
29

notion of private information being reflected in prices has a greater application than the
insider or individual with personal information making personal or individual trades
model.
The dark sector, also often termed the private sector of the market contains its
own information. In a way it functions like the inside trader in the above example,
holding information unavailable to the public about recent or current relevant trading
activity. The current structure surrounding trade and informational reporting requirements
allows for private sector participants to trade on the information in their sector without
informing the public of that relevant information set without punitive repercussions. Then
it appears that while the regulatory structure for individual traders gives value to personal
or insider information when an individual trades personally in the public market; while
the same informational components when transacted from the dark sector into the light
sector are viewed as valueless. In other words, the regulatory trading framework views
private information unavailable to the public learned in the personal or professional
context as both private and valuable, while information unavailable to the public learned
in the dark sector as private but invaluable, attaching legal recourse to the former and not
the latter. Regulators then seem to refute the Strong Form EMH in the personal or
insider-trading context while validating the Strong Form in the dark sector to light sector
trades. This dichotomy will be discussed at greater length in the section on regulatory
proposition.
Perhaps the most interesting intersection of the EMH model provides in the
context of the private versus public market sector discourse relates to the issue of price
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determination. Each iteration, version, reduction, and expansion of the EMH and even
those that stand to prove the model impossible, improbable and irrelevant support the
notion that information in some form is both relevant and necessary in determining
accurate prices. It deserves a bit of reiteration here that the dark sector does not find or
determine its own price, but derives or uses the price that is being offered in the light
market. So the public price is the price used in both sectors of the entire market, and the
price being found in the public market is inherently inefficient with regard to the
information available in the private market sector (in the real time).
How the price is found in the light market is extremely important. Price
determination is a haughtily contested and often debated topic; many different theories,
market models, and orientations coming from an even greater number of fundamental
theoretical foundations contend that the commodities, agents, and forums of exchange
create and mold the price at which a trade is transacted in an ever changing myriad of
ways. In the most basic sense, the interplay of the demand for an asset and the supply of
that asset can be used as the determinants of its price. When demand increases while
supply remains constant the price increases and when supply increases without an
increase in demand price decreases, and so on. In the securities market, demand reflects
the profit maximizing behavior of the market’s participants perceiving a trading
opportunity to make themselves a profit (through the change in a stock’s price) or lack
thereof. This dynamic is stabilized through a requirement that the market makers or
specialists at the public market exchanges always execute the entirety of the orders on
their books at any time. For example in the public market a supply of shares cannot sit on
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the exchange un-transacted, and an order for shares cannot go unfilled. In order to ‘clear’
their exchange the specialist or market makers either lower the transaction price to clear
surplus supply or increase the price to meet excess demand and so forth. However, the
key issue in this framework for consideration here is how market participants know what
direction the market is moving.
When transactions take place across the light market, informational reports on
each transacted volume and its price are reported real time (seconds). The public is
immediately made aware of the transactions, which have taken place, at what price those
transactions crossed the market, and how much of the asset was sold. This means that in
the light market when demand or supply shifts and transactions begin to move, the
market is aware of it and shifts immediately with all participants immediately clearing the
market. This type of informational and pricing model is considered both “fair” and
“equitable” in the regulatory context, and the framework of informational reporting for
trades that take place in the public sector seeks to keep this “fairness” intact. The
reporting of trades and their prices seeks to inform all public market participants of the
movements in the market, in essence informing them of the appropriate price that a stock
can be transacted at for any given time. This publicly reported and publicly determined
price is then used in the dark sector as a price marker for its transactions.
The non-reporting or dark sector, by definition, cannot find its own price. There is
no dissemination of information on the supply of, demand for, or volume of any stock in
the non-reporting sector. There is no requirement that non-reporting venues execute all
orders, demand for, or supply of any given stock. Within a single venue or aggregator,
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informational parameters exchanged between venue participants may give sufficient
information as to what the demand or supply of a given stock in that particular venue
might be, but without the price provided by the public market that inside venue
information is likely insufficient to find an accurate price.19 The notion that the market
has two-tiers of informational knowledge rests on the knowledge participants have about
what price should be available for making their transaction. The dark sector is aware both
of its own supply and demand for a given stock, and of the supply and demand for that
stock in the public market. An asymmetry or meaningful difference in information is
created when those two supply and demand relationships or those two prices do not
match. When the price being offered in the light market and the price available in the
non-reporting market do not match, the dark sector gains an informational advantage over
the public. Institutional investors privy to the knowledge about the price difference can
act on it, trading in the light, in the dark, or using both sectors, while the public cannot act
on the information it doesn’t have and may lose the opportunity for price benefit because
of it.
One key note worth repeating, there are many different forms of information and
this project only seeks to provide motivation for dark sector volume and trade reporting
as a means of informing the public sector of the information on trade volume and price in
the non-reporting venues. Other projects and the vast majority of research on
informational relationships in different market sectors within the greater securities
19

This dynamic is also present in the light market; where a sufficient amount of liquidity
in a stock has moved or been transacted in the dark market, the light sector may then be
unable to find an accurate price. Insufficient volume, or liquidity in a stock can make its
price unrealistic and inaccurate.
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landscape discuss informational asymmetries in a more detailed and nuanced fashion.
The previous models discuss informed and uninformed investors relating to levels of
individual information that some investors know while others do not. This dichotomy,
while indicative of the same relationship as the dark participants and their light
counterparts, has a different type of information at its core and a plethora of different
nuances and outcomes with regard to what informed participation means in the context of
the reporting and non-reporting sectors. In these studies the informed traders typically
carry information that comes from outside the market, information with some sort of
public time horizon (to be discussed following). The traders come into the trading venue
carrying information the public is as of yet unaware, information from outside the dark
and light sectors of the market20 and trade on that information. This style of informational
asymmetry carries a heavy and extensive foundation of research both theoretical and
empirical.21 The broad foundational behind the study of informational asymmetries in
finance stands to support the concept that with informational differences in market
participants come disproportionate profit and benefit availabilities. Market participants
with more information have a greater ability to profit from that information because they
know the appropriate or accurate price for an asset, while the uninformed do not know
what the appropriate price should be. In its more simple sense, this type of informational
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This type of information can be information relating to a forthcoming news report,
insider information, or any informational parameters from outside the market the
informed trader knows while the public does not. This information can also be described
as the information that the market is not yet efficient with regard to, or with which the
trader can still make a profit.
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disadvantage is the motivation for insider trading prohibitions and support for
disregarding the strongest form of the EMH. However, there is disagreement among
scholars as to how non-reported or hidden trading activity fits within the framework of
informational asymmetries. For many, the existence of hidden trading activity reduces the
ability of the market to find an accurate price, or increases the disparity between those
who are informed and those who lack information (Ye 2011 and Kyle 1985).
These models typically represent information as having a horizon, or only being
useful for a certain period of time. For example, this information could be the knowledge
a certain trader has about an earnings announcement yet to be reported, and the horizon
represents the time at which the report will be made to the public. Before the horizon has
been reached the trader has the information, while the public does not. This structure
functions well as an analogy for the type of information available to dark sector
participants because the reporting structure in the dark sector has an important horizon
for when the volume related information relating to the trades within the dark pool will
actually be made known to the public. Current US regulation creates a small but viable
horizon for the trade information within each venue where pool participants are aware of
the trade volume, and price, but the market at large has yet to be informed through CTA
reporting. However, this is only viable as an analogy since previous informational models
do not focus on the information contained within the dark pool itself but focus on trader
information brought into the market from outside with a horizon based not on trade
reporting, but on public informational releases.
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Zhu (early access December 2013) reflects a detailed culmination of the venue
and dark pool specific research on these types of informational asymmetries and produces
a persuasive argument for the inclusion of dark venues improving accurate price
discovery. This model and various others details the importance of motivating informed
traders into participating in the market in order for their trading behavior to add
information to the market necessary to determine an appropriate price. Zhu shows that
this self-selective behavior of informed traders employing anonymous-venues may
actually help the market to find appropriate prices so long as the volume and trade
information from dark venues gets reported real-time to the public exchanges. This
informational dynamic is the best balance and the most helpful academic work in putting
this thesis project into its proper place with regard to other market information and
informational asymmetries projects and research. The following regulatory suggestion
seeks to motivate a real-time reporting requirement for the trade volume and price
information within the trades taking place in the non-reporting sector only because of the
price information laden inside the trading itself. While research on informational
asymmetries has focused on the information traders and participants bring to the market
from the outside, this project seeks to provide an extremely simple motivation for
informing the market at large, not of outside information, but of the trade volume and
price information inside the venues and trades within the dark sector.

These are

differences in information access between the two market tiers relating strictly to trade
volumes and prices in the dark sector.
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Section VI.
Dark Models for Dark Propositions22
Because of the difference in reporting requirements currently in place for light
and dark transactions, the information received by the public is different than information
promulgated through dark channels. This informational case comparison makes the
opportunity available for dark market participants to benefit from the public’s lack of
unreported information by making a multi-part transaction using both the light and dark
sides of the market. Because the public does not have the transactional information
available to dark participants, the public can miss opportunities for price improvement
and allow dark participants to benefit from their missed opportunity. Below is a highly
simplified explanation of three different transactions and the three outcomes for
transaction participants. Following the brief description is a discussion of the results
when the simple case comparison is compared to various reality issues.
In these three cases the prices and risks are associated with the sectors that
transactions take place in, not with the asset being transacted itself (as is usually the case
when prices are discussed crossing the equity market). This focuses on a single block of
shares made up of a single asset. The price differences are related to the venues in which
the trade is being made and reflect the laden information being reported at each stage.
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“We meet again, at last. The circle is now complete. When I left you, I was but the
learner; now I am the master.” Darth Vader, Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977).
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The dark sector participant is the typical institutional investor and the public investor (or
purchaser) is a market participant who does not get the information in the dark pool until
the delayed dark pool reporting takes place.
This simple comparison involves an institutional investor making a one or two
part trade; light market only, dark market into the light market without real-time dark
reporting, and a dark to light trade with real-time reporting. The investor seeks to
purchase a large volume of a single stock from the market at large and, for all intensive
purposes, has no preference as to which market he uses so long as he can purchase the
shares as cheaply as possible. The three trades all take place across a single time period
consisting of three segments from T1 to T3. Each of the transactions begins at T1 and is
completed at T3. As each trade crosses the market from start to finish the price moves
from P3 to P1; moving from the lowest price (P1) through P2 and finishing at the highest
price (P3). Each price increase is equal to the previous one. It is also assumed that there
are no transactional differences in costs between transacting in the light and transacting in
the dark. These are strong assumptions but result in a meaningfully simple outcome,
which motivates a clean and simple discussion of the reality associated with each of these
assumptions.
Case 1: Traditional Public Exchange Transaction
Purchase across the light market and only the light market
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Case 2: Dark to Light Without Real-Time Reporting
Purchase in the dark market followed by a Purchase in the light market;
Reporting of the dark transaction (increase in demand) does not take place
until after the light transaction
Case 3: Dark to Light With Real-Time Reporting
Purchase in the dark market followed by a purchase in the light market
under a real-time dark trade-reporting requirement (dark transaction is
reported before light transaction takes place)
Each of the three simple models provides a different outcome for each market
participant. In Case 1 the institutional investor purchases a large volume of shares (1
million shares) through the light market and only the light market. The second the
purchase order enters the light market and transactions ensue, real time reporting of each
transaction (each share or smaller group of shares being sold to the institutional investor)
informed the public that the demand for the stock has increased, that volume is
transacting across the market, and that the price associated with the stock is rising. The
shares bleed across the market as supply fills his order, share-by-share, or group-bygroup. The entire 1 million shares are not purchased in a single clump at a single price.
The price moves from the lowest P1 to the highest P3 but the institutional investor does
not know how much of his desired volume will trade at what price and he cannot control
how many units cross the market at various prices. The purchase order for his large
volume of shares across the light market may immediately increase the price to P3 forcing
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all of his shares to cross the market at the highest price, forcing him to purchase all of his
shares at the highest possible price.
In Case 2 the institutional investor conducts a two-part transaction. He makes his
first purchase across a dark venue. He purchases the first half of his 1 Million shares
through a dark venue and as a result the transaction and its price are not reported real
time to the market at large before he begins his second transaction; purchasing the second
500 thousand shares through the light market. Both the first transaction and the second
transaction enter their respective venues at P1. The First transaction across the dark venue
transacts in its entirety at P1. The second transaction then enters the light market at P1
because the public-market it still unaware of the first transaction (unaware of the increase
in demand for the stock in the market as a whole). In the course of the second transaction
the stock crosses the market moving from P1 to P2. The institutional investor was able to
buy the entire stock volume with the first half at P1 and the second half at some price
between P1 and P2. The market price associated with the stock does not progress to P3
until the delayed reporting from the private sector informs the public sector that the first
transaction took place (informs the public market as to the full demand for the stock on
the market). Once this report takes place the institutional investor holds all 1 million
shares, now all worth P3, but he purchased those shares at a price between P1 and P2. In
short the institutional investor holds the same volume and worth as he held at the end of
the first transaction, but he purchased the shares at a much lower price. Also, in model 2
the public did not benefit from selling its shares at a price between prices P2 and P3
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because they were unaware of the first transaction’s information on the increased demand
for the stock on the market as a whole.
In Case 3 the institutional investor makes his first transaction through a dark
venue in the same fashion as he did in Model 2. He transacts the first 500 thousand shares
at P1. However, in this scenario the volume and price information related to his first trade
are reported to the public market real time. Moments following his first transaction the
public market is made aware of the increased demand for the stock he purchased and
increases its price from P1 to P2. The institutional investor then proceeds to make his
second transaction in the light market, purchasing another 500 thousand shares. This
time, the transaction enters the market at P2 and transacts across the market moving from
P2 to P3. Again at the end of the transactions the institutional investor holds 1 million
shares all valued at P3 and he has paid some price between P1 and P3 to get the shares. In
this scenario the institutional investor could still control the price of his very first
transaction in the private sector, purchasing the shares at P1, the key difference here is
that the public did not miss out23 on the chance to sell its shares to the institutional
investor between P2 and P3 when he went to make his transaction in the public market. In
this case, the institutional investor has the opportunity for arbitrage, more limited than in
the second case, but the level of control still available through the dark sector could be
considered a form of insurance against the risk of an erratic price jump if the transaction
was entirely transacted in the light. This case preserves a benefit to transacting in the dark
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The public does not recognize the entire price increase, some benefit still remains for
transacting in the dark sector for the institutional investor. However, the public does not
miss as much of the surplus transfer as they did in the second case.
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sector, while still protecting the public from completely missing out on the opportunity
for price improvement.
The reporting requirement, in particular the temporal requirement, separates these
two public and private trade scenarios. In the current regulatory framework the private
market participant can make market moving trades without suffering the price impact of
his trade by using a quick (but not necessarily high speed) two part transaction from the
private into the public sectors of the market, while still benefiting from the transaction
when delayed reporting takes place. A similar, though reversed, transaction can be
facilitated to avoid price impact in the sale of stock by an institutional investor. This
model is extremely simple, if not over simplified, however, the more realistic the
discussion of its price, transaction, and other concerns the more intense the disparity
between the private and public participants.
One key point of discussion is this comparison’s dependence on a simple price
structure. The price movements resulting from the purchases of large volumes of shares
across the different venues are obvious and simple, however, the assumption that each of
the prices achieved are equivalent is a stretch. It is more than likely that prices achieved
at each stage in the model above differ from venue to venue. It is possible that the cases
all begin at different prices, reach different prices in the interim and finish at different
times. None of these price differences change the fact that the institutional investor has
the ability to arbitrage and to control the appropriation of transaction surplus from the
public side of the transaction. In simple terms, without real time reporting the
institutional investor can control the entire surplus or price improvement and funnel it
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towards himself. With a real time requirement the institutional investor can arbitrage in
the dark transaction, but cannot prevent the public from taking price advantages that
result in the light market. In this instance it may also be true that the bifurcation of the
total trade volume here into two equal halves is a vast over simplification of the
institutional investor’s ability to control the amount, divisions, and trade volume that is
transacted in each sector during the trades. For example, the private participant can
balance his trade into many smaller subsections and then transact those pieces in
meaningful and intentional ways to both strategically move shares into and out of the
private sector while simultaneously moving them into and out of the public sector to
create the greatest benefit to the investor. The availability of this volume control dynamic
is at least partially responsible for the changes in trade volumes crossing dark venues
dropping on average over recent years. The simple single group block trade is no longer
the norm, broken or separated blocks are the typical transaction.
This creates both a more strategic break up in share groups being transacted in
each market, but also creates important distinctions in the price changes taking place
between the entering and leaving prices in each of the markets. The distance between buy
and sell prices or the spreads on markets are often sighted as being indicative of market
volatility. This type of transactional control coming out of the private sector of the market
has often been sighted as a cause of increased spread in prices and increased market
volatility (Degryse 2011, Jiang 2011, Weaver 2011, Comerton-Forde 2012, among others
discussed the market share held in the private sector of the market as being indicative of
volatility levels). Others have found that the market shares associated with a dark or
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private sector behaving in this manner may not lead to increasing volatility (Buti 2011,
Ye 2011). The previous studies relating the behavior of private sector participants and the
volatility of the market as a whole have generally assumed that the private sector of the
market reports its volume and price informational parameters to the public real time.24 It
is safe to assume that where dark sector participants can both use advanced strategies to
move stocks and prices in their favor and the public market remains unaware, even for a
short period of time, these strategies are likely move the market’s prices in volatile or
unpredictable ways.
In short, the price assumptions relating to the movements of prices as stock
volume crosses the market are an oversimplified version of how demand changes might
inform the dark without informing the public. The dark sector’s participants are more
aware and able to strategically trade than could be modeled in this simple comparison.
Many have sought to detail the behavior and strategies used by dark sector participants.
In short, the distances between prices, movements of the entry and exit prices, and the
general volatility of the market’s prices during and resulting from transactions only
serves to increase the value of the volume and price information contained in the
transactions taking place in the dark sector. With the growing market share transacting in
the dark market, the gains that result from these strategic trading practices cannot be
minimal or unlikely. The sophisticated use of dark and light informational parameters and
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Real-time private sector reporting exists in the vast majority of markets outside the US,
leading many who study the impact of various dark sectors to assume the real-time
transfer of information relating to price and volume from those sector to the public.
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reporting requirements presents a profitable market outlet for institutional investors to
strategically participate in the upper market tier.
The venues at which these transactions take place also come with issues,
differences, and complications of their own. The venues in the public and the private
sector execute trades in drastically different manners and as a result, have different
temporal qualities and costs associated with transacting in them. In the dark sector trades
may be executed through many venues in order to find sufficient liquidity or some
transactions may not be completed in full because of different constraints on price, time,
or venue number. In the public sector, market makers and specialists clear the market
balancing prices, demand and supply guaranteeing that transactions take place, but never
guaranteeing an execution price. While the NMS stocks are the same and the general buy
and sell structure of the two sectors matches, allowing liquidity held in one sector to
execute liquidity held in the other, the structure of the exchanges dramatically changes
the temporal signatures on how transactions are executed.
Assuming the time periods across which this model transaction is processed over
simplifies not only the transactional capabilities and trade offerings in the two sectors, but
also restricts the relationship the institutional investor has with the dark venues and that
which the public has with its light exchanges. In the dark sector, interest in making an
exchange is necessary to seek out other parties with whom to transact, while the public
simply enters its shares onto the light market without having to seek out other participants
with whom to transact. A dark sector participant is much more personally involved with
the venue through which he transacts, indicating his interest to transact, setting volumes
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and prices he seeks with his transaction, and reacting to results when his trade is either
accepted or volume is returned to him. The structure of the light market does not facilitate
this type of involvement. These types of dynamics can also be termed transactions related
costs because of the effort or time necessary to facilitate the transaction itself. In this
manner, the dark sector can require more effort in facilitating the transaction than the
light sector.
Transactional costs even differ among the means used to make transactions within
the light sector and within the dark sector. Some have speculated that the venues in the
dark sector can better diffuse of reduce transactional costs, while others have cited the
various costs of remaining informed while also participating in the dark sector as so
costly that they hinder participation in the sector as a whole (Conrad 2003, Brandes 2010,
Domowitz 2009, among many others). In short, differentiating between the costs of
transacting in either market carries nuances that are extremely difficult to measure and
depend highly on the type of transaction being sought and the participant seeking it. The
simple models assume that those choices are not at issue for neither the institutional
investor nor the public, and no choice of venue is given to either. This is both rigid and
simple, meant only to show that delayed reporting requirements lead to the public
missing out on opportunities for price improvement.
The issue of venue choice is not a menial one. Self-selection and selection biases
are crucial elements to the current shape and structure of academic research surrounding
the existence of dark sectors in any market. The dynamics, motivations, and structures
surrounding venue choice are outside the narrow breadth of this regulatory
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implementation motivation, however, venue choice and appeal are important issues to
close this model discussion with regard to some venue-by-venue and sector-by-sector
features. It is inaccurate to say that market participants do not have the ability to choose
where they transact. This ability depends highly on the sophistication of the investor and
their access to or carrying capital sufficient to transact in different settings or at various
costs. The private or dark sector, while on paper open to public participants, does not in
fact resent a viable trading opportunity for the average Jo-Schmo day trader. This facet
more generally motivates the assumption that only sophisticated institutional investors
trade in the private sector leaving the public both information-ally and trade opportunity
“stranded” in the pubic market. However, even within the private sector, venue and
aggregator differences lead pools to host similar clientele.
Dark pools are often termed “toxic” when they become overrun or saturated with
a certain type of trader. Venues in the dark sector often offer different types of trading
opportunities, many use the term commoditized trade offerings to describe the different
trade executions and types available in each venue (Banks 2010). This causes pools to
become saturated with traders looking for similar types of trades depending on the trade
capabilities offered in each pool. Research has also supported an increase in adverse
selection within pools that offer higher probabilities of execution (Sofianos and Xiang
2011). Others have found that different variations and degrees of pool saturation and
execution lead to varying biases in selection impacting prices, execution times, and
transactional impacts (Mittal 2008, Naes 2006). There is strong empirical support for the
notion that informed trading behavior and uninformed trading behavior tends to cluster
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itself both in time and by venue of execution, both of these dynamics function to support
self selection biases within the clusters themselves. (Admati 1988, Pagano 1989,
Chowdhry 1991). In short, trapping the public in the light sector while allowing the
institutional investor to trade between sectors was not inaccurate, but it fails to highlight
the risks associated with the institutional investor’s choice of which dark venue to make
his entry transaction. However, these concerns fall outside the direct relevance of
instituting a reporting requirement meant to inform the light sector as to the trades taking
place in the private venues, whether the venues are over saturated or not.
There is considerable additional research currently underway to both examine the
behavior of dark sector participants and the general welfare concerns with the existence
of dark liquidity more generally. While many believe the existence of dark liquidity to be
harmful to the market as a whole, there is little empirical work in existence to suggest
that the sector’s effect on the market or economy as a whole is deleterious. These models
and the above discussion serve only to motivate the implementation of truly real-time
reporting requirements on the sector and not to suggest any additional welfare or general
economic concerns with its existence outside of those relating to the unequal distribution
of dark sector volume and price information.
This case comparison was not intended to kill the dark sector or to make any
statements of judgment about its existence. Instead, the hope is only to inform the public
as to the necessary trade specific information necessary to make the public or light
market price accurate for the market as a whole. The implementation of real time
reporting in the dark sector will not open the dark sector to the public for participation
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and it does not ameliorate the current difficulties associated with how information is
reported through CTA. The reporting requirement only adds trade volume and price to
the list of other information that reaches CTA in real-time.
There are many other nations that already have real time post trade
reporting for these informational parameters.25 In both markets, even where real time post
trade reporting existed the dark sector still flourished and each nation took additional
steps in attempts to reduce the market share held in the dark sector (European
Commission 2010, D’Antona 2012, Lionidis 2013). There are disagreements as to the
exact effects that the implementation of post trade reporting can have on an already
established sector of the market that had previously existed without real time reporting.
The existence of a real time post trade volume and price reporting requirement does not
lead to the death of a dark sector and can exist without having a deleterious effect on the
growth of that sector, though it may cause the dynamics to change with regard to how
pool participants execute and structure their transactions (Canadian Dark Pools Consult
2009). The goal of real time reporting is not to “kill off” the dark sector. Countries with
these requirements have seen continued growth in market share going in to their dark
sectors. Reporting requirements are only meant to facilitate informing the market at large
to the trades that have taken place in the dark.

25

Canada and Australia among others.
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Section VII.
Dark Ends26
The information on trade volumes and prices within venues in the dark sector is
important to informing the market at large of the appropriate price for a given stock. The
current regulatory framework, while mandating volume reporting, does so with a delay
compared to the real-time reporting taking place in the public or light sector of the
market. Participants with access to both the private and public sectors can execute trades
based on knowledge learned from both sectors, while the public, without access to the
information about prices and volume housed in the private sector, cannot. Instituting a
real-time reporting requirement for the transactions taking place in the dark, without
touching other informational parameters therein bridges the price knowledge gap and
information-ally balances the information participants have about appropriate prices in
the market as a whole.
Real time reporting is not in itself perfect or ideal. The current regulatory focus on
high frequency trading only serves to highlight its downfalls. Many see the informational
controls available in the dark sector as a cure for the worries associated with real time
reporting, front running, and high frequency trading. These discussions are outside the
purview of this thesis. However, whether or not more inside venue controls help to

26

“I think my eyes are getting better. Instead of a big dark blur, I see a big light blur.” Han Solo, Star Wars Episode VI: Return of the Jedi (1983).
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ameliorate these problems the information necessary for the public to determine accurate
prices must be available to all market participants, not only those who have the capital
and sophistication necessary to participate in the dark sector. While the dark sector and
its venues are ‘open’ to all participants, the costs of meaningful participation and pool
membership to too costly for the average public participant. Sector participation
dynamics aside, the informational access and fairness ideals supported by the reporting
regulations requirements in the light sector should support the implementation of a
matching volume and price reporting regime in the dark sector.
The goal of this project was two-fold, to motivate a real-time reporting
requirement be implemented over trades taking place in the dark sector of the market, and
to bridge both the regulatory framework and the economic foundations surrounding the
informational asymmetries on the US securities market as a whole. The sectional
composition of this project and the simplified structure of its brief descriptions and model
reflect those two goals.

END
All errors, omission, misattributions, and misstatements herein contained are property of
the author and the author alone.
51

Bibliography
Admati, A. R., and Pfleiderer, P. 1988. A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price
Variability. Review of Financial Studies 1: 3–40.
Banks, Erik, “Dark Pools: The Structure and Future of Off-Exchange Trading and
Liquidity (Finance and Capital Markets)” 2010
Bennett, J., Colon, J., Feng, J., and Litwin, J. 2010. Ten Questions Every Institution
Should Ask Their Dark Pool Providers. Journal of Trading 5: 10–13.
Benveniste, L. M., Marcus, A. J., and Wilhelm, W. J. 1992. What’s Special about the
Specialist?. Journal of Financial Economics 32: 61–68.
Bloomfield, R. J., O’Hara, M., and Saar, G. 2012. Hidden Liquidity: Some New Light on
Dark Trading. Working paper Cornell University.
Bond, P., Edmans, A., and Goldstein, I. 2012. The Real Effects of Financial Markets.
Forthcoming, Annual Reviews of Financial Economics.
Boni, L., Brown, D. C., and Leach, J. C. 2012. Dark Pool Exclusivity Matters. Working
paper.
Boulatov, A., and George, T. J. 2013. Securities Trading when Liquidity Providers are
Informed. Review of Financial Studies 26: 2096–2137.
Brandes, Y., and Domowitz, I. 2010. Alternative Trading Systems in Europe: Trading
Performance by European Venues Post-MiFID. Journal of Trading 5: 17–30.
Brunnermeier, M. K., and Pedersen, L. H. 2005. Predatory Trading. Journal of Finance
60: 1825–1863.
Brunnermeier, M. K., and Pedersen, L. H. 2009. Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 22: 2201–2238.
Buti, S., Rindi, B., and Werner, I. M. 2011a. Dark Pool Trading Strategies. Working
paper.
Buti, S., Rindi, B., and Werner, I. M. 2011b. Diving into Dark Pools. Working paper
Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University.
Buti, S., Rindi, B., Wen, Y., and Werner, I. M. 2011. Tick Size Regulation, Intermarket
Competition and Sub-Penny Trading. Working paper.
Butler, G. (2007), Liquidity aggregation; What institutional investors need to know,
Journal of Trading 2:108-13.
52

Butler, G. 2007. Liquidity Aggregation: What Institutional Investors Need to Know.
Journal of Trading 2: 108–113.
Carlin, B. I., Lobo, M. S., and Viswanathan, S. 2007. Episodic Liquidity Crisis: Cooperative and Predatory Trading. Journal of Finance 62: 2235–2274.
Carrie, C. (2008), Illuminating the new dark influence on trading and U.S. market
structure. Journal of Trading 3:40-55.
Carrie, C. 2008. Illuminating the New Dark Influence on Trading and U.S. Market
Structure. Journal of Trading 3: 40–55.
CFA Institute 2009. Market Microstructure: The Impact of Fragmentation under the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. Technical report CFA Institute.
Chakravarty, S., and Holden, C. W. 1995. An Integrated Model of Market and Limit
Orders. Journal of Financial Intermediation 4: 213–241.
Chordia, T., Roll, R., and Subrahmanyam, A. 2011. Recent Trends in Trading Activity
and Market Quality. Journal of Financial Economics 101: 243–263.
Chowdhry, B., and Nanda, V. 1991. Multimarket Trading and Market Liquidity. Review
of Financial Studies 4: 483–511.
Comerton-Forde, C., and Putnins, T. 2012. Dark trading and price discovery. Working
paper.
Conrad, J., Johnson, K. M., and Wahal, S. 2003. Institutional trading and alternative
trading systems. Journal of Financial Economics 70: 99–134.
CSA/IIROC 2009. Dark Pools, Dark Orders, and Other Development in Market Structure in Canada. Consulation paper 23-404 Canadian Securities Administration and
Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada.
D’Antona, John Jr., Mixed Reviews for Canadian ‘Trade At’, TRADERS MAGAZINE (June 1,
2012) http://www.tradersmagazine.com/issues/ 25_338/trade-at-dark-pool110076-1.html
Degryse, H., de Jong, F., and van Kervel, V. 2011. The Impact of Dark and Visible
Fragmentation on Market Quality. Working paper.
Degryse, H., Van Achter, M., and Wuyts, G. 2009. Dynamic Order Submission Strategies with Competition between a Dealer Market and a Crossing Network. Journal
of Financial Economics 91: 319–338.

53

Domowitz, I., Finkelshteyn, I., and Yegerman, H. 2009. Cul de Sacs and Highways, An
Optical Tour of Dark Pool Trading Performance. Journal of Trading 4: 16–22.
Easley, D., Keifer, N. M., and O’Hara, M. 1996. Cream-Skimming or Profit-Sharing?
The Curious Role of Purchased Order Flow. Journal of Finance 51: 811–833.
European Commission 2010. Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID). Public consultation European Commission.
Feltman, Peter, CQ Roll Call “Nasdaq Eases Routing for ‘Dark Pool’ Trading, 2013 WL
6491961
Feltman, Peter, CQ Roll Call “NYSE Extends Retail Access to Dark Pools Program,”
2013 WL 74033624
Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., FINRA 2010 Year In Review and Annual Financial Report 3
(2011) [URL: http://finra.org]
Fitz-Gerald, Keith, Are “Dark Pools” Destined to Be the Capital Market’s Next Black
Hole?, MoneyMorning.com, July 10, 2008.
Fleming, M., and Nguyen, G. 2013. Order Flow Segmentation and the Role of Dark
Trading in the Price Discovery of U.S. Treasury Securities. Working paper.
Foley, S., Malinova, K., and Park, A. 2013. Dark Trading on Public Exchanges. Working
paper.
Foster, D., Gervais, S., and Ramaswamy, K. 2007. The Benefits of Volume-Conditional
Order-Crossing. Working paper.
Foucault, T. 1999. Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in a Dynamic Limit Order
Market. Journal of Financial Markets 2: 99–134.
Foucault, T., Kadan, O., and Kandel, E. 2005. Limit Order Book as a Market for
Liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 18: 1171–1217.
Gallo, Aubrey, “XI. DARK POOL LIQUIDITY,” Review of Banking and Financial Law,
29 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 88 (Fall 2009).
Garfinkel, J. A., and Nimalendran, M. 2003. Market Structure and Trader Anonymity: An
Analysis of Insider Trading. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38:
591–610.
Glosten, L. R., and Milgrom, P. R. 1985. Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist
Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics
14: 71–100.
54

Goettler, R. L., Parlour, C. A., and Rajan, U. 2005. Equilibrium in a Dynamic Limit
Order Market. Journal of Finance 60: 2149–2192.
Goettler, R. L., Parlour, C. A., and Rajan, U. 2009. Informed Traders and Limit Order
Markets. Journal of Financial Economics 93: 67–87.
Grammig, J., Schiereck, D., and Theissen, E. 2001. Knowing Me, Knowing You: Trader
Anonymity and Informed Trading in Parallel Markets. Journal of Financial
Markets 4: 358–412.
Guerrieri, V., and Shimer, R. 2012. Dynamic Adverse Selection: A Theory of Illiquidity,
Fire Sales, and Flight to Quality. Working paper. University of Chicago.
Hatch, Robert, “Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the Spotlight on the
Security and Exchange Commissions Regulatory proposal Concerning Dark Pools
of Liquidity” (July 2010).
Hendershott, T., and Jones, C. M. 2005. Island Goes Dark: Transparency, Fragmentation, and Regulation. Review of Financial Studies 18: 743–793.
Hendershott, T., and Mendelson, H. 2000. Crossing Networks and Dealer Marekts:
Competition and Performance. Journal of Finance 55: 2071–2115.
Holden, C. W., and Subrahmanyam, A. 1992. Long-Lived Private Information and
Imperfect Competition. Journal of Finance 47: 247–270.
International Organization of Securities Commissions 2010. Issues Raised by Dark Liquidity. Consultation report Technical Committee of the International Organization
of Securities Commissions.
International Organization of Securities Commissions 2011. Principles for Dark Liquidity. Final report Technical Committee of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions.
Jiang, C., McInish, T., and Upson, J. 2011. Why Fragmented Markets Have Better Market Quality: The Flight of Liquidity Order Flows to Off Exchange Venues.
Working paper.
Johnson, B. (2011), Algorithmic trading & DMA: An introduction to direct access
trading strategies. London, Myeloma Press.
Johnson, B. 2010. Algorithmic Trading & DMA: An introduction to direct access trading
strategies: . 4Myeloma Press, London.
Kaniel, R., and Liu, H. 2006. So What Orders Do Informed Traders Use?. Journal of
Business 79: 1867–1913.
55

Kyle, A. S. 1985. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica 53: 1315–
1335.
Langevoort, Donald C., U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3
Va.L.&Bus.Rev. 191-203 (2008)
Lemke, Thomas P., Lins, Gerald T., Trading and Execution: a primer – Alternative
trading systems-“Dark Pools,” Soft Dollars and Other Trading Activities, Chapter
1: Introduction and Overview § 1:45 (November 2012).
George Lionidis, ASIC Gets Tough on Dark Pool Activity, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Aug. 13,
2013, available at 2013 WLNR 19884138.
Macey, Jonathan, Novogrod, Caroline, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 936 (2012).
Madhavan, A., and Cheng, M. 1997. In Search of Liquidity: Block Traders in the
Upstairs and Downstairs Markets. Review of Financial Studies 10: 175–203.
Mittal, H. 2008. Are You Playing in a Toxic Dark Pool? A Guide to Preventing
Information Leakage. The Journal of Trading 3: 20–33.
Næs, R., and Odegaard, B. A. 2006. Equity trading by institutional investors: To cross or
not to cross?. Journal of Financial Markets 9: 79–99.
Nimalendran, M., and Ray, S. 2013. Informational Linkages Between Dark and Lit
Trading Venues. Forthcoming, Journal of Financial Markets.
O’Hara, M. 2003. Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery. Journal of Finance 58: 1335–1354.
O’Hara, M., and Ye, M. 2011. Is Market Fragmentation Harming Market Quality?.
Journal of Financial Economics 100: 459–474.
Pagano, M. 1989. Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity. Quarterly Journal of Economics
104: 255–274.
Parlour, C. 1998. Price Dynamics in Limit Order Markets. Review of Financial Studies
11: 789–816.
Parlour, C. A., and Seppi, D. J. 2008. Limit Order Markets: A Survey. Chapter 3,
Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking.
Ready, M. J. 2012. Determinants of Volume in Dark Pools. Working paper University of
Wisconsin-Madison.
56

Regulation ATS – Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300-.303 (2009).
Regulation NMS – Regulation of the National Market Trading System, 17 C.F.R. §§
242.600-.621 (2009)
Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
34-40760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,847 (Dec. 22, 1998).
Rosenblatt Securities 2011. Let there be light. Market structure analysis.
Rosu, I. 2009. A Dynamic Model of the Limit Order Book. Review of Financial Studies
22: 4601–4641.
Saraiya, N., and Mittal, H. 2009. Understanding and Avoiding Adverse Selection in Dark
Pools. Working paper Investment Technology Group.
SEC Open Meeting Fact Sheet, October 21, 2009, “Strengthening the Regulation of Dark
Pools.” [ URL: http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-223-fs.htm]
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C § 77 (2006).
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C § 78 (2006), 17 C.F.R. § 242.300 (2006).
Securities Regulation Law Journal, 38 No. 1, “SEC Proposes Amendments Relating to
‘Dark Pools’ of Liquidity;”
Seppi, D. 1990. Equilibrium Block Trading and Asymmetric Information. Journal of
Finance 45: 73–94.
Sofianos, G., and Xiang, J. 2011. Dark Pool Races, Part Two. Working paper. Goldman
Sachs.
Sun, Y. 2006. The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization
of insurable risks. Journal of Economic Theory 126: 31–69.
Tabb Group 2011. Liquidity Matrix. Technical report.
Weaver, D. 2011. Off-Exchange Reporting and Market Quality in a Fragmented Market
Structure. Working paper.
Ye, M. 2010. Non-execution and Market Share of Crossing Networks. Working paper
University of Illinois.
Ye, M. 2011. A Glimpse into the Dark: Price Formation, Transaction Costs and Market
Share of the Crossing Network. Working paper University of Illinois.
13 No. 7 Wallstreetlawyer.com: Sec. Elec.
57

17 No. 4 Wallstreetlawyer.com: Sec. Elec.
187835 WL (1998) Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading, S.E.C. Release
No. 34-39884 (File No. S7-12-98; 17 CFR Parts 201, 240, 242 and 249; 67 S.E.C.
Docket 2339) (April 17, 1998).
61 F.R. 48290-01 (1996) Order Execution Obligations, S.E.C. Release No. 34-37619A
(File No. S7-30-95; 17 CFR Part 240) (September 12, 1996).
65 F.R. 51716-01 (2000) Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, S.E.C. Release Nos.
33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599 (File No. S7-31-99; 17 C.F.R. Parts 240, 243, and
249) (August 24, 2000).
74 F.R. 61208-01 (2009) Regulation of Non-Pubic Trading Interests, S.E.C. Release No.
34-60997 (File No. S7-27-09; 17 C.F.R. Part 242) (November 23, 2009).
75 F.R. 3594-01 (2011) Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, S.E.C. release No.
34-61358 (File No. S7-02-10; 17 C.F.R. Part 242) (January 11, 2011).
76 F.R. 46960-01 (2011) Large Trader Reporting, S.E.C. Release No. 34-64976 (File No.
S7-10-10; 17 C.F.R. Parts 240 and 249) (August 2, 2011)(Final Rule).
78 F.R. 18084-01 (2013) Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, S.E.C. Release
No. 34-69077 (File No. S7-01-13; 7 C.F.R. Parts 242 and 249) (March 25, 2013).
8472602 WL (2011) Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, FINRA Exemptions from
Equity Trade Reporting, S.E.C. Release No. 34-65695 (File No. SR-FINRA2011-051; 102 S.E.C. Docket 1478) (November 4, 2011).
5615955 WL (2013) Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, FINRA To Require
Alternative Trading Systems to Report Volume Information to FINRA and Use
Unique Market Participant Identifiers, S.E.C. Release No. 34-70676 (File No. RFINRA-2013-042) (October 22, 2013).

58

Appendix 1
Regulations and Regulatory Entities27
Regulatory Documents
Securities Act of 1933 (The Securities Act) 15 U.S.C § 77 and The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (The Exchange Act) 15 U.S.C § 77:
Regulatory responsibility under the Acts was delegated to the Securities and
Exchange Commission; the Commission is responsible for providing and
promulgating rules under the acts that protect investors and foster efficient capital
formation. The 1933 Securities Act is focused on regulating the offering and
classification of different securities, while the 1934 Exchange Act is focused on
the exchange of securities in the primary and secondary markets. Securities
exchange venues are regulated and defined within the framework of the 1934 Act
while the securities and assets, which are traded on them are defined and
regulated within the 1933 Act.
Regulation on Order Handling Rules (1997): Regulation OHR requires all market makers
and specialists to provide their best quotations and to explicitly report the spread
that each stock is being purchased and sold across (the best or lowest price at
which to purchase the stock and the best or highest price at which to sell the
stock). (61 F.R. 48290-01;see also; Banks 8)
Regulation of Alternative Trading Systems (1998): Regulation ATS served to greater
define the regulatory application to venues within the section 6 Exchange Act
definitions. (17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300-.303 (2009).)
Regulation on Fair Disclosure (2000): Regulation FD required public companies, or
companies whose stock is held publicly and traded on exchanges, to report certain
information to the public. (65 F.R. 51716-01; see also; Banks 9)
Regulation National Market System (2005/2007/2009): Regulation NMS required that all
exchanges aggregate their trading and publish (publicly) their quotations for each
of the assets they carried or traded. The Regulation also required that trades be
executed at the best price available at the time the trade is executed. (17 C.F.R. §§
242.600-.621 (2009)(Regulation NMS was originally passed in 2004 and was then
updated/revised in 2007 and 2009); see also; Donald C. Langevoort, U.S.
Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 Va.L.&Bus.Rev. 191-203
(2008).
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“It's against my programming to impersonate a deity.” - C-3PO, Star Wars: Episode
VI, Return of the Jedi (1983).
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Regulatory Bodies
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): Also known as The Commission.
Regulatory responsibility under the 1933 and 1934 Acts was delegated to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC is responsible for providing and
promulgating rules under the acts that protect investors and foster efficient capital
formation. The Commission is also responsible for regulating and overseeing
regulation of the entities, securities, and other objects under the Acts.
The Consolidated Tape Associated (CTA): The CTA is a self-regulatory organization and
has the authority from the SEC pursuant to regulation NMS to enact reporting
requirements and to monitor the reporting behavior of broker-dealers and ATS’s.
The association is officiated by the public or light market exchanges,
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): FINRA is the self-regulatory
organization that regulates all U.S. broker-dealers and their relationship with the
investors they service. The organization and its authority were created pursuant to
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act such that the organization would be selfregulatory and contain its own regulatory framework under the oversight of the
SEC. FINRA is responsible for the surveillance, enforcement, and investigation of
more than 80% of the U.S. equity sector.
(FINRA Website, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ ; see also;
Macey, Jonathan, Novogrod, Caroline, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 Hofstra L. Rev. 936 (2012).; see
also; Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., FINRA 2010 Year In Review and Annual Financial
Report 3 (2011) http://finra.org).
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Appendix 2
Terminology28
Alternative Trading Systems: Alternative trading systems are trading venues that are not
regulated as exchanges. These venues match buyers and sellers and facilitate
transactions, but they do not fall within the regulatory framework for public
exchanges. In short, alternative trading systems are any non-exchange trading
system that matches buyer and seller; this definition is very broad and covers a
range of different types of venues and services.
Aggregator / Venue Aggregator: Venues aggregators exist to offer traders access to
multiple venues through one hub; where the aggregator acts as the hub. An
aggregator is a single hub that has access to multiple venues under its control. The
aggregator does not transact or execute trades; it only provides access to the
venues its houses or has access to. Because the aggregator does not execute
trades, it is not subject to trade regulation, each venue is subject to regulation
because each executes trades, but the aggregator is not.
Block Trading: A block trade is simply a group or large volume of shares to be transacted
at once. A block can come in any size, 10 shares to 1 million shares, but it is most
common to refer to block trading when discussing a large volume of shares (1,000
of more). Many define block trading as being specific to transactions made
outside the exchange, simply because trading a block suggests that the block
moves in a single transaction, and that sort of trade control does not exist through
the exchanges. However, the “block” description only relates to the volume of
shares grouped together for a particular transaction, large or small.
Crossing Network (CN): Defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission as an
Alternative Trading System, crossing networks, “…Allow participants to enter
priced orders which are then executed with matching interest at a single price,
typically derived from the primary public market for each crossed security.”
(Securities and Exchange Commission, “Regulation of Exchanges,” 1997.)
Crossing networks are both the most common dark venue and the most simple
venue design. The typical crossing network uses a computerized buyer-seller
matching system, and allows for a variety of different informational controls
surrounding the trade itself (size controls, participant controls, timing, etc).
Dark Liquidity: Also known as dark pools are also described as private trading liquidity.
Dark liquidity is liquidity hat is either housed or traded in a way that does not
reveal its presence, volume, price or other characteristic to the public. Many also
add privacy in access to the definition because it is typically assumed that public
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does not have access to execute with this liquidity. The privacy or darkness of a
given pool of liquidity depends on the different variety or extent to which
information is shielded form the public. In this way, some pools that reveal some
information to the public are termed “grey.” The darkness or level of privacy in a
given pool is the level of informational privacy or control that is attached to the
liquidity in that pool. Additionally, many describe the darkness relating to the
pool that houses the liquidity or the exchange it is traded across while others
related it to the liquidity itself either existing in the public eye or not.
Dark Sector / Dark Market: The dark sector is the full culmination of the dark liquidity
on the market as a whole. This sector includes all the varying degrees of darkness
and includes any liquidity on the market where at least some of the informational
components are private, or inaccessible to the public. Current estimates as to the
market share of the dark sector in the US range form 20-40% with little support as
to the accuracy of either end of that estimate. The dark sector as a whole does not
have a single type of privacy, there are multiple different subsectors and subparameters that are made public and private at any time. Each pool within the
sector can have a different darkness at any time and the escort as a whole is a
constantly evolving landscape of black, grey, white and everything in between.
Dark Venue: A dark venue is any mechanism that executed trades consisting of dark
assets or dark liquidity. The most common and most simple dark venue is the
Crossing Network (CN). These venues include any trading mechanism that allows
participants to privatize information or hide informational parameters with regard
to the liquidity being transacted from the public. This includes any shade or
amount of informational control that takes place, grey to truly dark. These venues
are often used as the tub in which a dark pool sits in the definition for a dark pool
focusing on the informational controls provided by a given venue.
Informational Parameters: Informational parameters can be defined loosely as pieces of
information relating to an asset, trade, or relating to other market issues. This can
include the size of the trade, price of the transaction, required price, trade issuer or
purchaser, trade location, trade volume, or a host of other trade related
information. Parameters can both include what is reported out of trade and what
information is exchanged during or before the transaction itself. Informational
parameters are especially important in the dark sector where the parameters and
their availability can differ from one venue to the next. In the light sector the
common informational parameter is the price of a given asset.
Institutional Investor: The definitions surrounding institutional investors come in many
different forms. In the context of this discussion, these are sophisticated investors
who are capable of participating in both the private and public sectors of the
market. This means they have the ability to use information they learn in each
sector, to forecast market movements, and to strategically make trades between
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sectors and venues to best benefit themselves. These entities typically carry heavy
stores of fungible capital to make trades, hedge risks, and move large sums on the
market.
Liquidity: Liquidity is the ease by which the market can facilitate a trade. However, in
discussing dark liquidity it is helpful to note the secondary definition hidden
within the facilitation definition. Liquidity is at its base a description of the
availability of shares held by parties willing to trade, and even more simply, the
volume of stock that a venue or market participant has access to when trades are
available. Within this definition dark liquidity facilitates trades where
informational parameters can be controlled, while light liquidity facilitates public
trading. The level of liquidity reveals the ease at which those trades can be
undertaken, high liquidity means easy trading, low liquidity and it may be
difficult to find trading opportunities.
Market Consolidation: Consolidation is essentially the opposite of fragmentation. The
market condenses from many venues into several or fewer venues. This is
typically a description of market behavior used to describe the more recent
movement in the dark sector. While the sector started off with an explosion of
many executionary venues the landscape is currently consolidating itself into a
system of several venue aggregators with few independent or individual venues.
Many view consolidation as the necessary result form the application of real time
volume and price reporting, many view the behavior of the Canadian market
following the implementation of real time reporting requirements demonstrating
this dynamic.
Market Fragmentation: Generally this fragmentation can be defined as the splitting of a
single market into multiple and separate sub-markets; each sub-market possessing
its own liquidity and interacting forces of supply and demand. In the market as a
whole, fragmentation is often discussed in relationship to liquidity moving from
one sector to the other (dark/light). In the context of the dark sector alone, this is
typically discussed in relationship to the early development of the sector by the
emergence of many small venues dividing the sector into many small venues
housing small liquidity. There are many differing views as to the results of
fragmentation, increased competition as a benefit or decreased general liquidity as
a set back. However, more generally, fragmentation simply describes the structure
of the liquidity on the market or in a sector; spread like a sallow sea among many
venues is highly fragmented, while a single deep pool has little fragmentation.
Market Share: In the context of market sectors, a market share is the percentage or
volume of the market that is transacted in a sector or across a venue. The market
share trading across a venue is the measure of volume in stock that gets transacted
across that venue. Measuring the volume of liquidity that is exchanged in the dark
sector is extremely difficult. The measurement standards among venues and
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aggregators are not uniform and market share measurement for the sector as a
whole and venue by venue vary immensely and little work exists supporting a
standard measure or a method to determine the accuracy of any of the volume
analyses.
Price Discovery: Price discovery is the act of finding an equilibrium or market clearing
price where demand for an asset and the supply of that asset clear the market or
match. In the light sector price is discovered through market clearing obligations
on market makers and specialists clearing book, or clearing the market of any
excess shares by transacting those shares by lowering the price. The reporting of
trades and market movements through real time reporting gives market
participants information they need in order to interpret what an appropriate price
should be and in what direction the market might be moving. Price discovery can
only take place where market participants can match supply and demand through
the information they receive regarding the availability of liquidity supply and the
demand for current transactions.
Secondary Market: The secondary market is the market that exists after an initial public
offering (IPO) has been made and investors are trading shares amongst
themselves and not with the companies or issuers that issued the stock into the
market during the IPO. The secondary market is the market where high
frequency, dark sector, and all other proprietary trading takes place. Study related
tot eh function and design of markets generally focuses on the secondary and nonIPO market unless specific investigation is taking place relating to the issuance of
stock to the market.
Trade Execution: Trade execution describes the actual transaction relating to the sale or
purchase of stock. In relationship to venues this is the descriptor used to
differentiate between venues that transact actual purchases and sales and those
that connect market participants to other venues or location where they can fulfill
their transactions. Trade execution is supposed to be fast, quick and efficient. It is
not true that when a market participants contacts an exchange or a broker that they
are directly connecting themselves to a securities market, their transaction may go
through several intermediaries before the transaction is actually executed.
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